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Abstract:
The banking sector has traditionally been an extremely important channel of financial intermediation
in the Czech Republic. Despite the fact that the Czech Republic stands out among accession countries
as the economy with relatively large commercial banking sector, its size remains in comparison to the
EU relatively low. The paper presents major economic developments and reform steps that recently
influenced the ability of credit institutions to channel financial savings into investment. In particular, it
explores the currency turmoil in May 1997 and subsequent recession of Czech economy and its impact
on the banks’ financial position. The bad loan problem, lack of creditworthy projects and substantially
increased caution of banks in granting new credits contributed to substantial slow-down (in fact
deceleration) in credit growth between 1998 and 2000. The paper draws several policy implications as
it focus on the following issues: institutional problems (privatisation and legal framework),
privatisation of banks, presence of foreign banks in the Czech Republic, sequencing of the financial
reform steps and framework of banking regulation and supervision. Presently, after the finished
privatisation of large banks (to mostly EU-based banks as new owners) and extensive clean-ups of
bank portfolios, the prudential indicators and efficiency of banks in the Czech Republic improved
significantly. These reform steps should contribute also to the increase of credit to the private sector.
The paper concludes that the Czech banks still have an enormous growth potential, especially in the
area of retail banking and lending to small and medium-sized enterprises. The higher efficiency of
banking sector in the allocation of resources and in the financing of investment needs should
contribute significantly to speeding-up of the real convergence towards the EU income levels.
                                                          
1 I would like to express thanks to Eliška Kuchynková from HVB Bank, Czech Republic for her helpful
suggestions and valuable comments during the preparation of this study.
2Introduction
The Czech Republic started the transition process with a centralised, nearly completely state
owned and inefficient financial sector. However, transformation of Czech banking sector has
made a remarkable progress since then. Banking based on market principles – with principles
of proper regulation and supervision – was established and former state-owned banking
institutions were privatised. Nevertheless, the financial sector, as in all candidate countries,
will have to still to go a long way before they can compare in terms of size, scope, efficiency
and stability with the financial sector in present EU member states. One of the main features
of candidate countries differing significantly from EU levels, though they vary considerably
from country to country, is the degree of financial intermediation.
The main objective of the paper is to identify key factors influencing the role of the banking
system in the financial intermediation in the Czech Republic. As the non-bank financial sector
in transition countries is still nascent and does not compensate for limited bank
intermediation, the banks play a key role in channelling savings into the productive
investment. The selection is not, however, arbitrary as banks play a crucial role as providers
of external finance in any financial system. However, their importance is underpinned by its
role in the transition process. Reininger (2002) suggests that, from the broader view, the
financial intermediaries play a compensating role for economic functions markets cannot
fulfil. Therefore the banks are a natural focal point in the description of financial institutions.
As the banking sector in the Czech Republic is presently in the final stage of its reform, the
prudential indicators and efficiency of the Czech banks improved significantly. The reform
steps included extensive clean-up of portfolios and long postponed privatisation. At present,
the banks in the hands of foreign strategic investors, that are hoped to enhance banks’
efficiency and competitiveness, dominate to the Czech market. However, the road towards
completion of banking sector reform has been often painful. In particular, the monetary
turbulence in May 1997 is often perceived as a catalyst for development of the banking sector
in the Czech Republic. Indeed, the change in the lending policy and connected decrease in
credit growth, especially of large state-owned banks, was in years 1998 to 2000 impressive.
An urgent need to re-asses the banks’ strategies had redirected the credit activities towards
less risky domestic securities. Of course, this must have had a structural impact on the
economy, since the small and medium sized companies are dependent mostly on the domestic
credit. At present, the lending to small and medium-sized enterprises, together with retail
banking, is therefore perceived as the key segment for growth of the banking sector in the
Czech Republic.
The paper is organised as follows: the first section focuses on the identification of position
and of growth potential of the Czech Republic in terms of financial intermediation. Moreover,
the link between financial intermediation and real convergence is briefly discussed on the
background of simple empirical analysis of cross-country data on EU accession countries. The
second section addresses the initial conditions and vulnerabilities that led in 1998-2000 to
substantial decrease in credit growth in the Czech Republic, as well as outlines the key
developments in the banking intermediation in the aftermath of 1997 monetary turmoil. The
third section briefly touches upon the present state and outlook of banking sector in the Czech
Republic. The fourth section arrives to comments on functioning of banking intermediation in
the Czech Republic and draws several policy recommendations. The final section includes
concluding remarks.
31. The present level of financial intermediation in the Czech Republic
1.1 Dominance of the banking in financial intermediation in the Czech republic
The financial systems in the accession countries are predominantly bank-based, whereas
domestic equity and bond markets remain small. This is also the case of the Czech Republic,
where the banking sector is at the core of domestic financial intermediation. In the financial
sector of the Czech republic with total assets amounting to around 160% of GDP, the banks
still hold dominating position with a share in total assets of about 85% (see Table 1).
Table 1: Key figures on financial institutions (2001)
At the outset of transition, the banks faced no competition in selling their products (i.e.
providing credit) from capital markets. Moreover, the banks had a dominant position with
regard to competing for savings and undeveloped capital markets played only a marginal role
in the intermediation of savings into the productive investment. Though, it was not surprising
as capital markets had to be created from nothing2. Moreover, the pension system (pay-as-
you-go) in the Czech Republic has not provided incentives to population to save for
retirement and the investments into pension funds became popular only lately. The redirection
of funds from saving accounts – that was practically the only mean for the wider population to
accumulate financial wealth in the past decade - towards other instruments in the financial
market has only been gradual. Therefore, the share of banking in financial sector has been
falling only slightly over the past years of transition.
1.2 Comparison of banking intermediation with the EU and other accession countries
Although the banks create by far the most important pillar of financial intermediation in the
EU accession countries, the degree of financial penetration through assets and loans is much
lower in these countries than in the EU and also in other emerging markets. However, the
Czech Republic has – in comparison with other CEEC-10 (i.e. group of the “transition”
accession countries)3 – a relatively large banking sector. The volume of the banking assets
amounted in the Czech Republic to about 132% of GDP (see Chart 1).
                                                          
2 Capital markets with its short history, due to the common history of central planned economies, play an even
smaller role Some authors (Desai, 1995) argue that the provision of outside funds to industry require the
involvement of banks and/or government, because capital (equity) markets fail.
3 Not including the countries with no “central planning” history: Cyprus, Malta and Turkey.
Number of Total assets Total assets Relative share in 
institutions (EUR bil.) (% GDP) total assets (%)
Deposit money banks 38 87.0 132 85
Insurance companies 43 6.4 10 6
Investment funds1 136 2.5 4 2
Pension funds 14 1.7 3 2
Credit unions2 52 … … …
Leasing companies 115 4.4 7 4
Sources: Ihnat, Procházka (2002); CNB, MoF CR, CSC.
1 Members of the Unis (Union of Investment Companies)
2 Relative share in total assts at the end of 2001 was 0.05%.
4The relatively high share of the commercial banking system in the Czech Republic is partially
result of historically high reliance on bank intermediation and of a large banking system
already under the socialist regime. This is confirmed also by the data on Slovakia (ranking as
CEEC-10 country number two with 95% share to GDP), with which the Czech republic
formerly created one federation state. On the other side of the spectrum, the countries like
Lithuania and Romania with banking assets of less than one fourth of the Czech Republic,
mostly as result of banking crises (Reininger, 2001).
Chart 1: Size of the banking sector in accession countries (2001)
(banking assets in % of GDP)
Source: ECB (2002), IFS.
The low degree of intermediation in the EU accession countries is reflected also on the
liability side. The share of deposits to GDP in the CEEC-10 is only about one-third of that in
the eurozone. The Czech Republic, however, is again among the countries with highest share
of 62 % of GDP (in 2002). The relatively high level of deposits in the banking system reflects
the fact that the Czech Republic (in the comparison with other transition countries) did not
undergo during transition the severe periods of hyperinflation, which would have eroded the
real value of banks’ liabilities. The Czech banking sector has been neither facing a major
challenge in terms of problems with lower confidence in the system.
1.3 Financial intermediation and
growth performance in the EU
accession countries
It is certainly important to ask how the
level of financial intermediation in
CEECs influences the investment in the
economy and consequently economic
growth. As Chart 2 suggests, the size
(and also by other means the costs) of
financial intermediation has a direct
effect on domestic investment. The
candidate countries with comparatively
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5high degree of financial intermediation (measured as commercial banks´ deposits – see Chart
24), are also the countries with the highest investment propensity in the country. The data on
the Czech Republic confirm this hypothesis, as this country with relatively high level of
banking deposits shows also correspondingly high degree of gross capital formation.
Subsequently, one can argue that the level of investment might indirectly influence the speed
of real convergence of EU candidates towards the EU levels. As it might be expected, higher
investment in candidate countries
tended to coincide with higher GDP
growth over the period 1995 – 2000.
This is suggested by Chart 3, despite
the fact that the causality between
those two variables might not be
straightforward. Obviously,
successful real convergence hinges
not only upon size and efficiency of
financial intermediation, but also on
the stability of the financial sector as
a whole, its participants and
functioning of regulating institutions.
The Czech Republic belongs to the
group of three “outlying” countries
(together with Bulgaria and
Romania). Indeed, these countries experienced adjustment crises between 1995 and 2000. The
Chart 4 clearly suggests that their investment rates5 did not translate into the same investment
return in the form of growth, as it was the case on the average in other “no crisis” countries.
While the benefits and the need for greater investment in catching-up countries are by now
largely undisputed, the chart clearly suggests that there are also challenges that need to be
addressed in terms of ensuring the success of banking sector. Therefore, the factors that
influenced stability and development of banking sector in the Czech Republic in 1990’s and
subsequently the present volume of credit to the Czech economy are in detail identified in the
following chapter
2. Banking sector development in the Czech Republic in 1990s
This chapter will provide background for explaining the different behaviour of the banking
system in the Czech Republic (in comparison to other economies of accession countries) and
discuss the factors influencing banking intermediation and credit to private sector. For this
reason, it is important to identify in brief the specific features of the transition and, in
particular, of genesis of the banking sector in the Czech Republic in 1990s.
Early years of transition
The Czech Republic has undertaken a substantial effort during the last decade to build a new
financial system under the constraints of the transition process from central planning to
                                                          
4 Source of Charts 3 and 4: European Commission (2001); own calculations.
5 The Czech Republic belongs to the accession countries with highest saving ratio over the whole period of
transition.
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
10 15 20 25 30 35
Gross f ixed capital formation (in % of GDP)
Chart 3: Growth and Investment (av. 1995-2000)
GDP 
grow th 
(in %)
CZ
SI
PL
LV
LT
EE
SKMT
HU
CY
BG RO
6market economy. In the formerly planned regime, financial markets were non-existent: the
“monobank” provided loans based on the decisions of the planning bureau and remunerating
them at regulated prices. The country embarked in 1990 on the rapid liberalisation of its
financial markets. It involved the creation of functioning capital market through a program of
mass privatisation, along with the establishment of a universal two-tier banking system with
central bank and commercial banks. The large state-owned banks were partially privatised
during the first wave of voucher privatisation6. In this respect, the Czech Republic was in mid
1990s considered as one of the most successful examples of the post-socialist reform.
The dominance of banking sector, by far most important financial channel of the economy,
was based on three factors: stability of macroeconomic environment, almost the “non-
existence” of the capital market, and the institutional framework (including the method of
privatisation). First, at the outset of transition, the Czech authorities successfully dealt  –
which was not the case in all CEECs countries – with potential macroeconomic instability.
The relatively stable, low inflation environment did not allow for depreciation of bank assets
and the erosion of savings. As a result, the households did not have to sacrifice their savings
for other types of assets in order to hedge against inflation. On the other hand, the stable
macroeconomic environment and the currency devaluation in 1990-1991 did not create any
incentives for needed restructuring of privatised enterprise sector and did not put sufficient
pressure on the microsphere as to find alternative sources of financing. Second, an economic
system with inefficient legal framework and high level of information asymmetry led to the
situation in which banking sector developed faster that the capital markets. Moreover, the
evidence from the first half of 1990s also shows that some of the main institutions created to
oversee industrial-financial reform have been converted into the instruments of indirect,
selective credit-allocation, largely due to the leverage of economically non-viable firms and
their large-bank creditors (Desai, 1995). Third, the dependency of the Czech business sector
on the credits also resulted from the method of privatisation chosen, where the lack of
domestic capital implied that the privatisation cases were largely financed by bank loans. The
method of privatisation also contributed to the fact that the capital market was squeezed by
the countervailing effects of universals banking laws as the banks had powers to manage
investment funds (as they were often holding a decisive share of privatising firms).
Mid 1990s – sharp credit growth
The mid 1990s can be characterised by a sharp credit growth reaching 10-15 % in real terms
that was, inter alia, fostered by and inflow of short-term capital. The fast growth of money
supply, combined with quickly growing wages and consumer spending boosted domestic
demand. As the fiscal policy (in the framework of fixed exchange rate regime) was not very
supportive in addressing macroeconomic imbalances, the Czech economy experienced an
overheating by 1996.
A relatively high level of credit to the corporate sector in the Czech Republic in 1994 (see
Table 2) reflected both the “banking tradition” and also the political willingness of state-
owned banks to provide cheap credit, fearing that bankruptcies of the largest firms will send
unemployment figures soaring. As a result, the dependency of the business sector on credits
led in mid 1990s to situation which showed symptoms of over-borrowing and over-
indebtedness (Hampl-Matoušek, 2000).  The level of credit to corporate sector in the Czech
                                                          
6 However, the state kept controlling stakes in these banks (over 50% in Česká spořitelna and Československá
obchodní banka, 47.4% in IPB and 44% in Komerční banka).
7Republic (55.2%) was many times higher than that of neighbouring countries, with Hungary
registered credits to GDP of around 19% and Poland 15.4% in 1994.
Table 2: Stock of domestic credit of the banking system
average, in % of GDP
Source: CNB, Reininger (2002)
However, the institutional framework led to inefficiencies, as the privatising firms largely
demanded cheap credit, and old state banks were tied up in bad loans. Consequently, financial
preference had been extended to some firms and restricted to others. The inflexible banking
sector was not therefore capable of an effective allocation as the resources exceeded the
capacity of the business sector in relation to its performance. The misallocation of available
resources and under-investment in some (even profitable firms) due to various distributional
struggles was the unfortunate result. However, overall still expansive lending policy of banks
supported the rise in the prices of assets. The high growth rate of credits in mid 1990s backed
by collateral (increasing its price considerably, mainly in the form of real estate), was not in
line with the real profitability of investment projects7. This was reflected by high share of
both classified loans and loss loans in the portfolios of Czech commercial banks.
Credit contraction in 1998-2000
The economic overheating of the Czech economy in 1996 resulted into a current account
deficit of almost 8% of GDP. The restrictive monetary policy measures, however, were no
efficient in addressing of persistent macroeconomic instability. In May 1997, the Czech
Republic experienced monetary turmoil during which both nominal and real interest rates
jumped sharply. This turmoil was a significant factor that influenced and dramatically
changed patterns of banking intermediation in the Czech Republic. Following fundamental
shift in lending practices between 1997 and 1999, that influenced also the credit to private
sector, was largely caused by the changes in the behaviour especially of the supply side of the
credit market (i.e. banks).
After the monetary turbulence, it was not surprising that banking sector behaviour resembled
other economies (for instance Southeast Asia in the end of 1990s). However, unlike in many
                                                          
7 The Czech economy also registered over the 1990s a very high investment ratio (about 30% of GDP), but the
productivity of these investments was very often low, in particular in comparison to other CEECs countries.
1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000
Credit to households 8.6 6.2 5.9 3.4 1.2 6.1
Credit to corporate sector 55.2 47.1 (55.0) 18.9 22.2 15.4 20.3
Net credit to poblic sector 1.0 4.7 28.8 10.1 15.7 8.4
Net credit to OFIs 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.3
Total * 64.7 58.0 (65.8) 53.6 36.8 32.3 36.0
Note: Czech Republic - data in brackets indicate the size of the credit that would have been 
reached if there had not been transfers of non-performing loans to state owned Consolidation Bank 
between 1998 and 2000.
OFIs = other financial institutions than deposit money banks.
*including FX denominated credit
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
8other emerging market crises, the main problems of the banking sector were not linked
directly to exchange and interest rate risk taken by the banking sector. As the banks in the
Czech Republic carried out large share of their foreign borrowing to domestic companies in
foreign currency, the over-all foreign-exchange position was close to balance. At the same
time, the short foreign exchange positions were hedged largely by off-balance-sheet
operations. This helped significantly to reduce the scope of the crisis. The monetary turmoil in
May 1997 therefore directly undermined neither solvency nor confidence in the banking
sector and. Needless to say, the prudential approach of banking supervision to managing
foreign exchange risk played an important role in this respect.
However, since the second half of 1997 we could monitor the year-on-year decline in growth
rate of lending in the Czech Republic, that became in fact negative in real terms during 1999
and 2000 (see Chart 4). This is because the Czech banks were not completely immune to the
consequences of currency turmoil, as subsequent economic recession negatively influenced
the performance of domestic firms and thus exacerbated the excessive credit risk of often
over-borrowed and over-indebted companies. Perhaps a more straightforward explanation of
the impact of turmoil on the position of banking sector suggests that – by passing foreign
borrowing to often non-hedged domestic companies – the banks just transformed the foreign
exchange risk into a credit risk. As a result, the Czech banks were not influenced by the
monetary turbulence directly, but rather through credit-risk channel with lag of about one to
two years (Tůma, 2002).
Chart 4: Credit growth of the banking sector, Czech Republic
year-on-year change, in %
Source: Czech National Bank
The decline in lending (since approximately second half of 1997) – as argued Hampl-
Matoušek (2000) – was, among other things, caused by a change in the behaviour of the group
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9of large banks8, especially Česká spořitelna (CS) and Komerční banka (KB). These state-
owned banks experienced the sudden deviation from their former lending activity. A
significant drop in the nominal volume of standard loans in the period of 1997 to 1999 (see
Table 3), was connected to sudden deterioration in quality of bank’s credit portfolios. This
had the roots in the irrational credit allocation of the banks in question in the previous years of
transition and can be explained primarily by two factors. First, the privatisation methods
widely used bank loans, because of a lack of domestic capital, as a source of financing. These
resources were not primarily used for restructuring of the companies (machinery, new
technologies, etc.), but for further (sometimes very excessive) expansion in the form of
mergers and acquisitions, often of the companies incapable of being restructured. Moreover,
the recipients of the credits were often the entities with weak capital structure and dependent
on bank loans. Second, moral hazard of state-owned banks was strengthened by the implicit
state guarantee that provided “financial support net” for covering of any financial difficulties
the banks might have. One of the reasons for this behaviour was certainly the importance of
the CS and KB in the Czech banking sector, i.e. “too big too fail” argument applied in this
case also.
Table 3: Real growth in lending (dissagregation of credit activity in the group of four
large banks in the Czech Republic
(in %)
Source: Moody´s Investor Service; Hampl-Matoušek (2000)
The reasons for after-turmoil decline in credit growth in the Czech Republic were therefore
closely related to the performance of the economy during first phase of transition in the first
half of 1990s. The struggle for majority in companies (as it was mentioned, due to the
privatisation method) contributed to the overvaluation of corporate assets. When the prices of
assets begun to shift downwards in the aftermath of currency turmoil, the overvaluation of
assets in the form of real estate or securities (mainly as collateral for the companies´ loans
used in turn for privatisation) appeared to be of a great burden for banks. Also worsening of
the quality of loans, in relation with economic decline in 1998 and 1999, combined with
imposition of stricter bank regulations resulted in additional provisioning needs by banks. All
these factors were connected with more prudential, i.e. significantly lower lending, and
replacing credit transactions with safe trading in government securities9.
                                                          
8 Since beginning of transition, the Czech banking sector has functioned with a high level of concentration. The
three of the largest banks (CSOB, Komercni banka and CS) have over two thirds share of the market measured
by the market volume.
9 The increase in real interest rates also contributed to contraction of credit. However, this factor cannot fully
explain the decline in lending in the period 1997 – 1999. After the exchange rate turbulence, interest rates shifted
to a higher level than in previous period , but real interest rate gradually returned to pre-turbulence levels already
in the second half of 1998.
1996 1997 1998
Československá obchodní banka -4.03 18.17 13.32
Investiční a poštovní banka 7.95 -0.02 4.62
Komerční banka 3.45 -4.13 -21.39
Česká spořitelna 8.99 7.29 -18.36
10
As far as the distribution of credit by sector is concerned (see Chart 5), a decline in lending of
CZK 65 billion in nominal terms was recorded in the industry from May 1997 to September
1999. The most substantial decline was in manufacturing of CZK 55 billion, i.e. the nominal
decrease of about 20%. A substantial decline recorded also the business lending (small
entrepreneurs) over the reviewed period (over CZK 20 bn.). On the other hand, the household
lending experienced completely different developments as its dynamic was, especially by the
end of reviewed period very high (increase by 170 percentage points in nominal terms). The
increase of household lending was mainly generated by a rise in mortgages (increase by 702
percentage points over the reviewed period), by the introduction of new financial products
and also by re-assessment of the strategies of commercial banks (low default risk at household
sector). During this period, also willingness of households to demand credit followed an
upward trajectory (in order to buy both consumer and long-term character goods).
Nevertheless, an increase in household lending could only partially offset the decline in total
credit (its share in total was less than 15%), with dominating influence of rapidly falling credit
to industry and construction.
Chart 5: Credit growth in the Czech Republic: breakdown by sectors
(y-o-y; in %)
Source: Czech National Bank
Banking intermediation in the aftermath of currency turmoil
Despite a robust loosening of monetary policy, the response of the banking and corporate
sectors was negligible. Corporate clients were, in the recession of the Czech economy,
crippled by lack of creditworthy projects and with debt burden. The destructive feature of
credit contraction can be explained using the example of companies that were dependent on
bank credit. It is widely understandable that any sudden credit contraction to such firms must
cause their unbearable financial difficulties. The attention also shifted to issue of so-called
credit crunch10, dealing with the problem of stagnation of granted loans when both nominal
                                                          
10 Hampl-Matoušek (2000), however, confirm the view that the situation in the Czech credit market during
second half of 1990s did not evolve in the “credit crunch” textbook sense (i.e. situation where there is a sudden
and unexpected change in the credit market without outwardly changing the relevant macroeconomic conditions
on the market - interest rates, company performance etc.).
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and real interest rates reached historically low levels11. Banks did not engaged in the
extension of the credit as they were hampered by high volumes of bad loans (acquired in the
preceding period of the credit expansion). Another factor influencing the development of
credit was the way of managing of the large state-owned banks as they were waiting for their
long postponed privatisation (ČSOB, Komerční banka and Česká spořitelna).
The increased caution of banks in granting new credits contributed to finding an alternative
way to substitute for domestic credit (in the presence of still underdeveloped capital market)
in the form of the inflow of foreign direct investment. This was extremely important, in
particular, in terms of generating sufficient liquidity for economic recovery in the Czech
Republic from year 1999 onwards. However, this was a solution of credit shortage mainly for
large corporate sector companies and subsidiaries of the foreign multinationals, as they had an
extensive access to financing abroad. By contrast, small and medium sized enterprises
(SMEs) could not use such channel as easily and were more dependent on the domestic
banking sector. Indeed, the SMEs are typically more prone to the problems of asymmetric
information, often deepened by lack collateral or credit track record. Indeed, this must have
had a significant structural impact on the economy, since the small and medium sized
companies are dependent mostly on domestic credit.
The bad loan problem forced the government to engage in the extensive clean-ups of the state-
owned banks before their privatisation to the hands of foreign owners. The costs connected
with this operation amounted to CZK 33.4 bn. for Česká spořitelna (privatised by Erste Bank
in 2000) and CZK 51.4 bn. for Komerční banka (sold to Societe Generale in 2001).  A bailout
of IPB (the minority stake was sold in 1998), that was taken under conservatorship in June
2000 and its activities resold to CSOB, are estimated to be in order of CZK 100 bn. The direct
costs of banking sector reform for the state were equivalent to roughly 20% of yearly GDP.
3. Present developments in the Czech banking sector and expected trends in
banking intermediation
Present developments in the Czech banking sector
Presently, the Czech banking system (as of June 2002) consists of 37 banks and foreign bank
branches, down from the highest number of 55 in 1994. The largest decrease occurred, not
surprisingly, in 1997 to 1999 as a result of their poor financial conditions. After the finished
privatisation of large banks (mostly EU-based banks as new owners) and extensive clean-ups
of bank portfolios, the prudential indicators of Czech banking sector improved significantly12.
The striking feature of present Czech banking system is a high presence of foreign banks (see
Table 4), as their market share grew sharply with continued privatisation in years 2000-2001.
However, this was not the case ever since the outset of transition, as the foreign banks took
primarily care of their “own clients” getting started their business in the Czech Republic. As
the time passed by, they acquired the knowledge about domestic environment, monitoring
                                                          
11 The main operating rate of the Czech National Bank declined subsequently from 15% in July 1998 to the level
of 5.5% during about one year (in the total number of 17 steps). The real interest rates (ex ate) ranged at that
time between 0 – 3%.
12 For instance: capital adequacy of banking sector increased from 12.10% in 1998 to 15.4% in 2001. At the
same period, the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans fell from 20.4% to 13.7% and classified credits as
% of total credits from 26.5% to 21.5%.
12
costs were reduced and, most importantly, they played an active role in privatising of large
state-owned banks. At the beginning of 1990s their share was not more than 5% share in total
assets of banking sector. An increased presence was marked by 20% share in 1996 and – after
finished privatisation - a clear dominance achieved by foreign capital was reflected with
94.2% share in 2001. Of course, the foreign ownership of local banks does not imply
increased foreign indebtedness13, as the banks are involved in intermediating local currency.
On the contrary, more stable and functional financial sector is likely to encourage more
effective intermediation of domestic savings into local investment. This is a factor reducing
the dependency on cross-border capital flows (for large companies and foreign subsidiaries)
and – more importantly – it is opening new financing possibilities of SMEs.
Table 4: Ownership of the bank assets in the Czech Republic
(in %; end 2001)
Source: Czech National Bank
In 2002, there has been continued growth in the volume of client deposits, despite
introduction of alternative savings products14. However, aggregate loans to enterprise sector
(see Chart 5) have stagnated, mainly due to the fact that many banks have reduced their
exposure to highly risky borrowers. At present, while banks after implementing stricter risk
management measures generally face difficulties in finding good projects and lending
opportunities in the corporate banking area, the retail banking sector in the Czech Republic
has continued to be a rapidly growing market. All its parts, including consumer (due to the
increasing willingness of Czechs to buy on credit) and housing finance (due to the historically
low level of interest rates) have experienced exceptional growth-consumer finance and
housing finance and further growth is expected.
Since recently, also due to the fact that foreign banks started to play a key role in enhancing
the Czech banking system's performance, the profitability of the banking sector as a whole
has followed an upward trend. It was mainly a result of new efficiency measures leading to a
sizeable reduction in administration costs and expanding revenue sources (growing
commission income and interest income on retail loans). Foreign investors in the Czech
banking are also expected to exert further pressures on cost cutting as to assure high returns
and to provide the continuous flow of know-how as to address widely recognised need to
innovate banking products to the EU standards. Moreover, risk management’s stricter
discipline on borrowers and more sophisticated credit management procedures imposed by
foreign owners have led to substantial decline in the volume of non-performing loans. The
overall stability of the Czech banks, as reflected in the bank's capital adequacy ratios, has
been improving and is continuously high as it exceeds the 8 percent benchmark by a wide
margin (the indicator increased from 12.10% in 1998 to 15.4% in 2001).
In 2002, new legislative norms affecting the Czech banking market were introduced. In
particular, The Law on Banks aimed at harmonising the legal framework in the Czech banking
                                                          
13 However, the expected outflow of profits from foreign banks is likely to influence the balance of the current
account of the balance of payments.
14 For instance mutual funds, pension funds and life assurance.
end 2001
Foreign capital 94.2%
State and municipalities 3.8%
Czech private holders 2.0%
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market with that of EU countries. The law covered, among other issues, the principle of a
single banking license, new concepts of banking supervision, and the new scope of the deposit
protection scheme (including the termination of anonymous savings accounts). In order to
eliminate the lack of information on debtors, new credit registrars have been put in place - one
for corporate clients and entrepreneurs, run by the Czech National Bank and one for
individuals, operated by the Czech Credit Bureau. As far as the transition to new banking
standards is concerned, the Czech banks will face numerous challenges arising from full
harmonisation of domestic laws with EU legislation and the implementation of the new
capital adequacy concept (Basle II).
All these „healthy“ trends in the Czech banking sector will undoubtedly contribute to
increased efficiency in the allocation of resources, and in the longer run, to financing of
catching-up process towards the income levels in the EU countries. Generally, in the run-up to
the EU accession, the Czech banking sector will be affected by strong competitive pressures
in the banking industry and, as the Czech Republic is small and open economy, also by global
trends.
Expected trends in banking intermediation in the Czech Republic
The Czech banking sector is likely to maintain, due to the domestic tradition, the leading role
in the financial intermediation in the Czech Republic. However, its relative importance could
diminish in the longer run. The dependence of enterprises on domestic credits will likely
decrease in the future, as it will be increasingly substituted by funds of the parent companies
or by access to capital markets (both national and international) as a consequence of entry of
foreign strategic investors into the corporate sector. Another reason supporting view on
increasing presence of other means of financial intermediation than banking is the
harmonisation of legal and institutional infrastructure with the EU acquis. This should
increase level of the “playing-field” and to eliminate regulatory differences between particular
segments of the financial sector (Ihnát, Procházka, 2002).
However, the absolute growth of banking and financial intermediation carried through this
sector will be closely linked with the development of domestic economy. While the Czech
Republic is among CEEC countries leader in banking intermediation, as measured by various
indicators, the size of the banking sector is only slightly over 50 percent EU average (as
measured by banking assets in % of GDP – see Section 1). The high-growth prospects of the
Czech economy posses therefore enormous potential for credit growth during the convergence
process. However, already highly competitive and large corporate segment offers only limited
opportunities and thin margins and as well as the rapidly intensifying competition in the retail
market. Most of the Czech banks have shifted their focus and “discovered” possibility of
SMEs sector growth15. The key segments for growth of the banking sector in the Czech
Republic will be therefore lending to small and medium-sized enterprises, as these segments
allow for the highest potential (together with retail banking) for growth and best use of
existing branch networks.
Also new trends in commercial banking are likely to influence the form of financial
intermediation in the Czech Republic, and in particular, the credit growth to the private sector.
Reflecting transmission of know-how within foreign owned banks and global banking
developments, banks operating in the Czech market are continuing to broaden the range of
                                                          
15 Kohout (2003) suggests that we may see triple-digit growth rates in the SME market in 2003.
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their products. In addition to standard retail and corporate products, local banks now offer
Internet banking, home banking, GSM banking, credit cards and also private banking and
wealth management services and other more sophisticated products. For example, with the
aim of capitalising on numerous cross-selling opportunities, local banks have become more
active in applying the integration of an insurance product into other financial service products.
There have been a few examples of such products launched recently, for instance the
combination of life assurance products with mortgage loans, motor insurance with leasing
services and various non-life insurance policies with payment card products.
4. The Czech case: Lessons to be learned?
Comparing the factors influencing the state of the financial intermediation in the Czech
Republic with the other EU acceding (transition) countries, we can arrive to a few general
conclusions and policy recommendations.
Institutional problems – privatisation and legal framework
Efficient banking sector channelling resources into the productive investment will not deliver
its results in terms of higher economic growth, if the challenge of ensuring the stability of
banking sector is not adequately addressed. As I have shown, the problem with credit
contraction in the Czech Republic that emerged after 1997 was largely a consequence of the
institutional problems during transition, especially with problematic privatisation and
inefficient legal framework16. In recent years, however, a substantial progress has been
achieved in the Czech Republic in the field of legal system. An important issue for banking
reform has been also a development of institutional framework that supports efficient
corporate governance and strengthening of creditor rights, especially through amendments of
key commercial laws.
Completion of banking sector privatisation
The state, as it was a similar case in other accession countries, generally proved to be for
banks during transition a non-optimal owner, mainly due to a conflict between economic and
political motivations. In the Czech Republic, the large banks (Česká spořitelna, Komerční
banka) remained under state control till late 1990s17 as the privatisation was long postponed
for largely political reasons. However, also the Czech case showed that privatisation of banks
– together with the clean up of their balance sheets18 – was the only solution that could have
revived the primary function of the banks, i.e. allocation of rare resources to the economy.
However, it is important to note that the privatisation to the hands of foreign owners should be
designed appropriately as to give the buyer sufficient incentives to restructure bank and to
manage it with a aim of long-run sustainable development. The Czech state is currently
involved in only two banks, which are specialised in government programs in the areas of
support for small businesses and export promotion.
Presence of foreign banks
                                                          
16 There were also views that the decline after 1997 was caused exclusively by changes in the macroeconomic
and monetary conditions. However, Hampl-Matoušek (2000) argue that the economic policy reacted to changed
conditions in the standard way, but the reaction of the economy was way above expectations, especially due to
presence of sub-optimal institutional conditions.
17 With exception of IPB where the state lost the control over the bank already in mid 1990s
18 Konsolidační banka (the state bank with primary function to clean-up the banks portfolios), was converted in
2001 into Česká konsolidační agentura (Czech Consolidation Agency).
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The Czech experience confirms the growing presence of the foreign (largely EU-based) banks
in the CEEC region. This has been of course closely linked to needed privatisation, as there
has been a lack of solvent and trustworthy domestic investors in the banking sector.
Moreover, the improvement of prudential indicators19 of the banking sector soon after the
entry of foreign banks into the formerly state-owned large banks suggest that financial sector
reform cannot be speedily and successfully implemented in isolation from outside world. The
privatisation in combination with foreign ownership offers a quicker route to improving the
quality of both banks and corporate governance. The foreign involvement has brought
benefits to the Czech Republic in the form of a rapid transfer of knowledge, especially in the
areas of risk assessment and management. The presence of the foreign bank is therefore
perceived to improve the quality, efficiency (pricing) and the availability of financial services.
It should in turn foster a more efficient allocation of financial resources, which should have a
positive impact on credit availability to private sector and in particular to the small and
medium sized enterprises.
Sequencing of the financial reform
The Czech Republic belonged to early liberalising countries in terms of financial account of
balance of payments, when the process was in fact in 1995 completed. However, the country
was relatively slow in the reform of banking sector. In the Czech case, the banking sector was
not in 1990s healthy shape in terms of general financial situation, credit allocation situation,
corporate governance etc. This was the case of many emerging markets in 1990s too, where
the weakness of the banking sector was one of the factors initiating the crisis. At the same
time, the reverse causality applies: the deterioration of the state of Czech banking sector was
also caused by unleashed monetary turmoil. As the capital inflows to transition and emerging
economies are largely intermediated through domestic banks, the banking system should have
fundamentally sound position as to achieve the best benefits of given resources. Should this
condition not be fulfilled, serious problems may emerge. Therefore, the banking reform
should be implemented without unnecessary delay and, in particular, the reform strategy
should be synchronised with the financial account liberalisation.
Regulation and supervision
The Czech banking regulation has played an important role in stabilisation of banking sector.
It significantly reduced the scope of the crisis as it has implemented stricter rules in several
areas (though in shorter run it could lead to additional provisioning needs by banks and thus
the measures could contribute to temporary decrease in credit growth). Since 1998 the major
effort has been in harmonisation the regulatory framework20 with the international best
practices and EU acquis. The effort of CNB to incorporate the recent trends of banking
supervision into the system included, for instance, a consolidated supervision of financial
groups, regulation on capital adequacy of banks incorporating credit and market risks, an
increasing emphasis on on-site examinations etc. Presently, the core elements of the Czech
legal and regulatory framework for the banking sector in the Czech republic are already in
line with what is being applied in the EU. However, the increasing integration of the Czech
economy into the EU and financial flows connected to the transition period before euro
introduction (for instance ERM II membership) could possibly increase the potential external
                                                          
19 For instance: capital adequacy of banking sector increased from 12.10% in 1998 to 15.4% in 2001. At the
same period, the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans fell from 20.4% to 13.7% and classified credits as
% of total credits from 26.5% to 21.5%.
20 The effort of CNB to incorporate the recent trends of banking supervision into the system included, for
instance, a consolidated supervision of financial groups, regulation on capital adequacy of banks incorporating
credit and market risks, an increasing emphasis on on-site examinations etc.
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vulnerabilities. This represents additional challenge to surveillance and monitoring capacity of
national authorities as to timely recognise potential vulnerabilities. Moreover, stronger co-
operation between supervisors both nationally and internationally will be forced in the future
by increasing sophistication of services and a more important role of financial conglomerates.
Conclusion
The level of financial intermediation in the Czech Republic is in comparison to the EU
countries still low. However, it remains, even after weak performance of banking sector in the
second half of 1990s, higher than in other transition countries. The discussion on the large
differences in the penetration of both banking assets and capital market securities in the
economies of individual accession countries is often exaggerated, though. This paper showed
that the potential benefits stemming from comparatively large banking systems will not
translate into the faster catching-up process if the challenges in terms of stability of banking
sector are not properly addressed. The high degree of financial intermediation affecting
directly domestic investment can only have a positive effect on the process of real
convergence only if the banking sector is functioning efficiently and sound macroeconomic
policies are pursued.
Indeed, it was not a coincidence that the credit contraction in the Czech Republic deepened in
the period following monetary turmoil in 1997 and after the change in economic policy. It
was rather a standard reaction of banking sector to the change of accumulated macroeconomic
and microeconomic conditions. In particular, from latter it is worth mentioning persistently
unfavourable institutional environment in the Czech Republic in 1990s, especially
problematic privatisation and non-standard legal framework. The policy response to such type
of crisis requires system-wide policy measures, addressing both institutional issues and
macroeconomic imbalance.
To sum up, the Czech experience indicates that what matters the most is the macroeconomic
stability, the efficiency in allocation of resources and the quality of market institutions and of
corporate governance. The reform period of the banking sector in the Czech Republic was
costly both in macroeconomic and fiscal terms. However, in the last few years, decisive action
has been taken to come to terms with mentioned shortcomings. After a lengthy period of
restructuring, the banking sector in the Czech Republic has now been put on a firm footing
and has enormous potential for the future growth, especially in retail banking and lending to
small and medium-sized enterprises. As a result of these efforts, the efficiency of bank
intermediation in the Czech Republic should accelerate in the years ahead.
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